Blessed WireTap, Who Eavesdropped on the Memory Bus

Patron of server SGX enclaves, DRAM bus interception, and everyone who trusts deterministic encryption.

Life

On 30 September 2025 a group spanning Georgia Tech, Purdue and others revealed WireTap: by physically tapping the DDR4 memory bus of an Intel server, with an interposer costing under a thousand dollars, one could recover the SGX attestation key from a single signature. With that key one could forge attestations and fool blockchain networks that rely on SGX. Intel considers physical attacks outside its threat model.

Prayer

O Blessed WireTap, who listen to the secrets travelling on the bus, let our enclaves live only in physically secure rooms. Amen.

How to celebrate

Celebrated by keeping servers in protected environments and not trusting SGX alone against those who touch the hardware.

Bus under lock, enclave safe.